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AN ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING PERSPECTIVE 
ON THE CONTRACTING PROCESS 
 
Abstract 
The contracting process is a crucial step in alliance development and its success. However, the 
existing literature reveals surprisingly little investigation into how organizational learning relates 
to the process of contract making. We therefore conducted an in-depth longitudinal study of the 
alliance contracting process in the animated film industry. First, our findings suggest that during 
the contracting process, firms can learn about the way to deal with the contracting process, about 
themselves and their partner, and about the transaction features. Second, the case analysis indicates 
a combination of experiential, vicarious, and inferential learning mechanisms. Combining these 
insights into the objects and the mechanisms of learning during the contracting process, we discuss 
how contracting and learning processes are related and analyze the role of the contracting process 
in supporting organizational learning. The findings show that the drafting of contractual clauses 
fosters learning and, in turn, this learning triggers new contractual negotiations. Hence we suggest 
that the alignment between transaction features and the choice of contractual governance results 
from learning during the contracting process. We then propose avenues for future research. 
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Acknowledging that contracts account for a substantial part of future alliance performance, 
strategy and organization researchers have paid increasing attention to the structure of alliance 
contracts (e.g. Lumineau and Malhotra, 2011; Reuer and Ariño, 2007; see Weber, Mayer, and Wu, 
2009, for a recent review). Scholars have in particular started to explore how learning relates to 
contracts (Argyres, Bercovitz, and Mayer, 2007; Dekker and Van den Abbeele, 2010; Mayer and 
Argyres, 2004; Ryall and Sampson, 2009; Vanneste and Puranam, 2010). Prior research has 
generally analyzed learning effects from one contract to the next. It has been suggested that the 
structures of contracts change over time as the firms gain experience in working together (Argyres 
et al., 2007; Mayer and Argyres, 2004). However, as the contract is generally seen as an outcome 
of the parties foreseeing hazards and the focus is mostly on the contractual structure, we still do 
not know much about what is learned during the contracting process and how this learning occurs. 
In addition, the processes preceding alliance formation, and particularly the process of contract 
making, have received very little attention (Ariño and Ring, 2010; Ring, 2006; Vlaar, Klijn, Ariño, 
and Reuer, 2010). 
In this paper, our aim is to develop a better understanding of the links between the contracting 
process and learning. Our study elaborates on organizational learning (e.g. Argote and Miron-
Spektor, 2011; Inkpen and Tsang, 2007) in order to analyze learning dimensions in the alliance 
contracting process. While considering the structure and the content of the contract, our approach 
focuses on the process that the parties use to draft the contract (Macneil, 1980). We seek to 
improve our knowledge of alliance contracting by studying both the objects and the types of 
learning during the contracting stage. We specifically explore the two following research 
questions: What is learned during the contracting process? and How is it learned? 
In view of the limited existing theory and empirical evidence, we use an in-depth case study to 
address our research questions. We conducted an exploratory longitudinal case study in the 
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animated film industry and followed contracting and learning processes over 17 months in a 
nonretrospective manner. This processual analysis outside the laboratory enables us to obtain a 
number of insights into the contracting process. 
Our research complements recent studies that have started to bring together learning and 
contracting perspectives in several ways. We highlight three main objects of learning for the firm: 
learning about the contracting process, learning about itself and the partner, and learning about the 
transaction features. Moreover, while previous studies have focused on learning by experience, we 
reveal a specific combination of three mechanisms of underlying learning processes during this 
stage of contractual making: experiential, vicarious, and inferential. This finding leads us to 
discuss how contracting and learning processes are related. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Our theoretical focus is based on three streams within the literature: interfirm contracts, 
organizational learning in alliances, and alliance processes. Following an overview of each of 
them, we will look at the bridges that have been built to date between these approaches. We will 
then identify some important gaps and introduce our research questions. 
 
Traditional approaches to interfirm contracts 
The last two decades have seen a surge in interorganizational and alliance contract-focused 
studies. This research has mostly drawn on economic theories around transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985), agency theory (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), and property rights theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1988). Empirical 
research has variously studied discrete contract provisions (e.g. Crocker and Masten, 1988; 
Joskow, 1987; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004), contractual complexity (e.g. Parkhe, 1993; Poppo and 
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Zenger, 2002), and contractual functions (e.g. Chen and Bharadwaj, 2009; Malhotra and 
Lumineau, 2011; Reuer and Ariño, 2007). For instance, the TCE approach emphasizes the need for 
an alignment between transaction attributes and contract characteristics (Williamson, 1985). The 
content of a contract (e.g. safeguards, penalties, auditing rights) is supposed to respond to the 
attributes of the transaction in terms of perceived opportunism risk, uncertainty, and asset 
specificity to minimize transaction costs (Sampson, 2004). The contract is seen as an outcome 
where farsighted parties look ahead, recognize hazards, and devise hazard mitigating responses 
(Williamson, 1999: 1090). Although it is recognized that actors are constrained by their bounded 
rationality while contracting (Williamson, 1985: 8), this literature does not say much about how 
actors may actually cope with their limited cognitive capabilities in elaborating a contract. Within 
this perspective, previous research has focused on the structural dimension of contractual 
governance. Contracting is therefore generally considered “as a once-and-for-all activity rather 
than as an evolving process requiring significant learning” (Argyres et al., 2007: 4). In fact, TCE 
has not yet fully incorporated learning into its theoretical framework (Williamson, 1999). This 
partly explains why prior research has largely focused on equilibrium contract designs and has 
rarely dealt with the nature of contractual learning processes (Argyres et al., 2007; Argyres and 
Mayer, 2007). 
 
Organizational learning in alliances 
The view of alliances as a vehicle for learning is the basis for an important body of research (see 
Inkpen and Tsang, 2007, for a review). Most studies on alliance learning have focused on 
experiential learning—such as trial-and-error or learning-by-doing—which is the process of 
making meaning from direct experience (Heimeriks, 2010; Prange, 1999). This type of learning 
covers the knowledge acquired through reflection on doing and accumulating experience (Argote, 
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1999). Studies that bring interfirm contracts and organizational learning together also focus on one 
type of learning, namely, experiential learning. In their seminal study, Mayer and Argyres (2004) 
look at contracting as a capability that firms are able to learn. As the relationship progressed, two 
contractual partners gradually learned how the other operated and this knowledge enabled them 
eventually to incorporate contract terms that took such factors into account. However, these 
authors insist that learning is essentially based on firms’ mutual experience. We find this same 
focus on experiential learning in most of the other studies concerning interorganizational 
contracting (Dekker and Van den Abbeele, 2010; Faems, Janssens, Madhok, and Van Looy, 2008; 
Ryall and Sampson. 2009; Vanneste and Puranam, 2010). 
Some studies on alliances have suggested that other types of learning exist besides experiential 
learning. In particular, some scholars have shown the presence of deliberate learning―that is,  
a type of learning process that relies on an explicit commitment on the part of firms, such as 
knowledge codification, cognitive efforts, or specific managerial attention (Simonin, 1997; 
Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007; Kale, Dyer, and Singh, 2002; Kale and Singh, 2007; Zollo and 
Winter, 2002). As pointed out by Zollo and Singh (2004: 1238), such a distinction between 
different types of learning is theoretically important because it assumes different underlying 
behavioral and cognitive processes. Looking at different sources of learning is also important for 
taking full advantage of the learning properties of alliances. However, the possibility of different 
types of learning has not yet been directly explored in contracting studies. 
Moreover, prior research has focused on how learning from working together has been manifested 
in the design of the contract (e.g. Dekker and Van den Abbeele, 2010), but we still know little 
about learning about the contracting process. For instance, Vanneste and Puranam (2010) 
specifically show that the learning effect is stronger for technical than for legal detail in contracts. 
Mayer and Argyres (2004) suggest that learning to contract not only concerns better contract 
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structures but also deals with how to collaborate more generally. Their findings indicate that firms 
may learn how to use contracts to manage their interfirm relationships over time. These authors 
then suggest that changes to the contractual structure mainly derive from learning how to work 
together, including how to contract with each other. Moreover, Argyres et al. (2007) find that 
some clauses behave as complements in contractual design and such a complementarity reflects 
the fact that firms may learn to achieve fit in their contract designs. Their study therefore implies 
that an understanding of contracts requires “going beyond equilibrium analysis to seek an 
understanding of the nature of contractual learning processes” (Argyres et al., 2007: 15). 
 
Processual approaches on alliances 
A number of studies adopting processual approaches (Szulanski, Porac, and Doz, 2005; Van de 
Ven, 1992) have challenged the static vision stemming from TCE (e.g. Ariño and de la Torre, 
1998; Doz 1996; Koza and Lewin, 1998; Kumar and Nti, 1998; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992, 1994; 
Zajac and Olsen, 1993). Dynamic approaches often view processes in alliances as cycles in which 
the outcome of collaboration is implemented and assessed. Depending on their assessment, firms 
undertake corrective actions, which lead them to set new conditions of cooperation. As pointed out 
by Das and Kumar (2007), while the notion of learning shaping alliance is implicitly embedded in 
those processual frameworks, only Doz (1996) and Kumar and Nti (1998) explicitly deal with the 
impact of learning on alliance evolution. For Doz (1996), learning cycles cumulate over time as 
participants progressively make increasing commitments to the alliance. Kumar and Nti (1998) 
develop a dynamic theoretical framework of alliances in which learning-related discrepancies may 
threaten commitment in the relationship. These two studies suggest sequences of learning, re-
evaluation, and readjustment stages following the accumulated experience.  
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Furthermore, recent reviews on alliance processes (Bell, den Ouden, and Ziggers, 2006; Salk, 
2005; Vlaar et al., 2010) note that the literature has essentially paid attention to the post-agreement 
processes―that is, after firms have signed a formal agreement. Scholars generally take the various 
forms of structural governance as the starting point. However, we still do not know much about the 
pre-agreement processes. In fact, the actual process of negotiating and drafting contracts has been 
somewhat neglected (Faems et al., 2008; Ring, 1997). Moreover, contractual changes are generally 
analyzed from one contract to the next (e.g. Mayer and Bercovitz, 2008; Ryall and Sampson, 
2009; Vanneste and Puranam, 2010), without considering the formation stage of the contract. 
It therefore appears that despite the interesting avenues opened up by prior research, our 
understanding of contractual learning processes seems bounded by four related limitations in the 
existing literature: (a) a focus on contracts as outcomes, (b) a focus on experiential learning, (c) a 
limited focus on the content of the learning processes, and (d) a focus on post-agreement stages of 
alliances. In this study, we specifically explore the two following research questions: What is 
learned during the contracting process? and How is it learned? 
 
METHODS 
A single case study analysis 
Given limited prior theory and empirical evidence, we use an in-depth case study to address our 
research questions. First, the detailed analysis of a single case is consistent with our theory 
building effort around unexplored questions (Edmonson and McManus, 2007; Yin, 2009). Second, 
the difficulty of obtaining detailed contract information has limited the empirical investigation of 
contracts (Chen and Bharadwaj, 2009), especially in regard to learning aspects. Third, while 
alliance learning processes have received limited attention (Inkpen, 2002), Inpken and Tsang 
(2007: 494) note that “one of the research challenges in this area is methodological. […] To 
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develop an understanding of complex alliance learning processes, the researcher must have deep 
and extensive access to the actual working of the alliance and alliance-partner interactions.” Since 
most previous studies have relied on cross-sectional data, they cannot examine the dynamics of 
learning over time in an unfolding partnership. Qualitative data offer insight into complex social 
processes that quantitative data cannot easily reveal (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). With our 
longitudinal study, we are thus able to respond to many recent calls for a finer understanding of the 
collaborative dynamics in alliances (Faems et al., 2008; Reuer, Zollo, and Singh, 2002; Vanneste 
and Puranam, 2010). 
 
Research setting 
We observed and studied a firm involved in an alliance formation in the animated film industry for 
a period of 17 months. The focal firm, Rosacom (names of the companies have been altered for 
reasons of confidentiality), is a small French organization employing 25 persons and specializing 
in visual communication. It acquired the exclusive rights to a famous toy and thus wanted to use 
these rights to create a series of short cartoon episodes for children. However, such a project 
entails substantial investment (about €3 million), which is beyond the reach of this small firm. To 
gain access to substantial financial resources and thereby enter the animated film industry, 
Rosacom decided to use an alliance. It therefore contacted Mediacorp, a publicly owned company 
(with sales of about €120 million) that produces television series, television films, and cartoons. 
Mediacorp—located in Paris— and Rosacom—located 300 miles away in the provinces—had no 
prior or other contemporaneous deals together. 
In the past decade, the animated film industry has experienced major changes with the 
development of computer-generated imagery. Computer-animated films rely on complex technical 
and creative capabilities and animated film budgets are much higher than they used to be. As a 
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result, animated films are now receiving greater recognition and are not simply limited to being 
“kids’ films.” 
This case is particularly well suited to address our research questions for several reasons. First, we 
had an opportunity for extremely unusual research access. We were able to collect data and make 
observations in a longitudinal way from the very beginning of the alliance process. Access to real-
time data in the very early stages of alliance formation processes is very hard to obtain (see Ariño 
and Ring, 2010, for an exception). The few case studies in this field have generally used 
retrospective data (e.g. Ariño and de la Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996; Faems et al., 2008). Second, while 
previous research has tended to view organizations involved in transaction as homogeneous agents 
(e.g. Inkpen and Currall, 2004), often gathering data from only one informant, we were allowed to 
interview all the knowledgeable informants in the focal firm. Third, we had access to each version 
of the contract, something that is hard to obtain because scholars studying interfirm contracts are 
often confronted with confidentiality issues (Ring, 2002; Weber et al., 2009). Fourth, we chose to 
study this firm because its managers had little experience in contract making in a new industry, 
which makes the learning mechanisms more visible (Argote, 1999). 
 
Data collection and analysis 
One of the authors attended, in a nonparticipative way (Van der Velde, Jansen, and Anderson, 
2004), all the meetings between Rosacom and Mediacorp from August 2005 (the first discussions 
between the firms) to December 2006 (the actual launch of the alliance). Other nonparticipant 
observational data, such as pre- and post-meeting observations and other general on-site 
interactions, were collected to achieve greater understanding of specific practices (Van Maanen, 
1979). Memos and detailed field notes were written to capture our feelings and thoughts on what 
we observed. We also had access to extensive archival data (contractual documents, minutes of 
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meetings, emails, etc.). In addition, we conducted 37 formal interviews over this period, ranging 
from one to three hours in length. We tape-recorded and transcribed each interview within 24 
hours. 
As we conducted successive interviews, we specifically asked the interviewee each time what had 
happened in the negotiation and contract drafting process since the preceding interview. We also 
left them to speak freely about their perception of the ongoing alliance formation. When actors 
mentioned a document, we used it as a basis of our discussion and they commented on it in front 
of us. We consistently asked interviewees to describe the chronology of events that led to contract 
changes. Following prior research (Argyris and Schön, 1978; Inkpen, 2000), we considered that 
organizational learning occurs when knowledge is processed and the range of potential behaviors 
increases. Learning may result in new insights and awareness and need not necessarily lead to 
observable changes in behavior (Friedlander, 1983; Huber, 1991). 
Our progressive data collection allowed us to mitigate retrospective rationalization, selective 
memory effects, and impression management (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Moreover, we 
tried to reduce potential informant biases by comparing data from different interviewees to get 
complementary perspectives on the same event (Cardinal, Sitkin, and Long, 2004; Golden, 1992). 
To improve the validity of our analysis, we also combined observations, interviews, and archival 
data (Eisenhardt, 1989). Triangulation between multiple sources of evidence provides greater 
accuracy and depth across different perspectives (Golden, 1992; Yin, 2009). Furthermore, we 
believe that the anonymity and confidentiality maintained throughout the study reduced the effects 
of social desirability bias (Konrad and Linnehan, 1995). 
We analyzed the longitudinal data by using a combination of narrative, bracketing, and visual 
mapping strategies (Langley, 1999). From the data, we built an extensive narration of the 
relationship, from which we extracted information on the dynamics of contract formation and the 
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nature and conditions of learning. 
 
INTERTWINED DYNAMICS BETWEEN NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTUAL 
DOCUMENTS 
The discussions between Rosacom top managers and the Mediacorp representative started in 
August 2005. It was the first time these two firms had done business together and Rosacom 
managers had no experience in managing or drafting contracts in this new industry. They therefore 
asked their partner Mediacorp to write a first version of the contract, which had to reflect their 
initial negotiations. From this point, there were five successive contract versions, with the fifth 
version actually being signed and becoming the contract used for the alliance. To facilitate the 
analysis, Figure 1 displays the main stages of the Rosacom-Mediacorp contracting process as well 
as details for each stage. 
––– Insert Figure 1 about here ––– 
The first version of the contract was entirely drafted by Mediacorp (Stage I). When the Rosacom 
managers received this version, they carefully read it using a legal consultancy. However, after 
several interviews and discussions about this first version of the contract, Rosacom managers 
decided to rely on a lawyer who specialized in intellectual property rather than their usual lawyer. 
The consulting lawyer observed that the contract was not sufficiently detailed and advised the 
Rosacom managers to renegotiate the agreement with Mediacorp. In response to their legal 
counsel’s advice, Rosacom managers asked their partner to produce a more detailed second draft. 
Mediacorp then drafted the second version of the contract (Stage II). At this stage, the Rosacom 
managers called on further external experts to help them to analyze the contract. Both the 
consultant and the lawyer supporting Rosacom reacted strongly to the clause relating to the 
exploitation of the series. They strongly recommended that Rosacom offer a new contract to 
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Mediacorp and their recommendations applied to most of the re-drafting of the contract. During 
this process of contract drafting and interpretation of certain clauses, Rosacom managers 
progressively revised their opinion about their trading partner. When Mediacorp received the third 
version (Stage III), its chief negotiator observed that it was substantially different from the second 
version. He then asked for a meeting to negotiate the details of certain points. However, at this 
stage, Rosacom was more aware of the real value of its contribution to the project and therefore 
decided to adopt a more aggressive stance in negotiations. After this new round of negotiations, 
the consultant again pointed out some imprecisions in the contract. Following the legal 
consultant’s recommendations (Stage IV), the two Rosacom managers then asked for another 
meeting with Mediacorp. The parties finally achieved a mutually satisfactory contract, which was 
then signed (Stage V). 
Our analysis of the five successive contract versions is summarized in Table 1 and Figure 2.  
In Table 1, we focus on the evolution of the contractual content. We highlight the different 
versions of two key clauses in the Rosacom-Mediacorp alliance: the clause concerning the 
marketing and merchandising of the series of cartoon episodes and the clause concerning the 
location of art management. 
––– Insert Table 1 about here ––– 
Figure 2 reports our analysis of the evolving contractual complexity. In line with previous 
research, we measured both the total length of the contract (e.g. Poppo and Zenger, 2002) and the 
total number of clauses (e.g. Parkhe, 1993). 
––– Insert Figure 2 about here ––– 
Interestingly, both this content analysis of two major clauses and this simple count analysis 
highlight a nonlinear development of the contract. Although the third version is the longest (6211 
words for 25 clauses; i.e. an average of 248 words per clause), the fifth version contains the most 
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detailed drafting (5932 words for 21 clauses; i.e. an average of 282 words per clause, a ratio 13.7% 
higher than in the third version). 
 
THE OBJECTS AND MECHANISMS OF LEARNING IN THE CONTRACTING 
PROCESS 
The data provide evidence for three main objects of learning: learning about the contracting 
process, learning about the firm itself and the partner, and learning about the transaction features. 
Moreover, the data suggest a specific combination of three types of learning: experiential, 
vicarious, and inferential. 
 
The objects of learning 
About the contracting process 
Our field data show that during the contracting process, Rosacom progressively improved its 
knowledge about the allocation of resources and, in particular, the use of experts, as well as its 
general knowledge of the contract role and structure. 
During the observed stage of contract making, Rosacom managers learned to solicit, gather, and 
use advice from competent professionals. For instance, Rosacom managers discovered the 
limitations of their usual lawyer and finally sought the services of a specialized lawyer (Stage I.1). 
It is interesting to note that this rather simple lesson was learned through the contracting process 
and not in some other way. While our focal firm could have easily and quickly learned about the 
right experts to mobilize for such a project through other means (through professional meetings, 
for example), it decided to bear these heavy additional costs when their initial lawyer was 
confronted with the writing of the contract. Likewise, Rosacom managers progressively learned 
about the consultant’s knowledge and past experience and decided to expand his role by having 
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him participate in writing the contract (Stage II.1). This change induced modifications in process 
organizing, which in turn modified interactions between the contract and negotiation trajectories. 
Accordingly, Rosacom managers sharpened their perception of who had the relevant knowledge in 
a given situation. Learning here mainly concerned the ability to call on the right expert at the right 
time in order to apply their knowledge to the alliance contract. This type of learning thus has a 
“meta” feature to the extent that it does not relate primarily to legal or technical knowledge 
directly linked to the contractual writings but rather to outlying knowledge. 
Consistent with the recognition of the need for a more skilled—and therefore expensive—lawyer, 
Rosacom managers also modified their perceptions of the contract’s importance. 
“The initial contract was very short, it’s true […] But in fact, under twenty pages, you can 
do nothing […] We now have more than one year of negotiation behind us: imagine if we 
had signed the contract at the outset!” [Rosacom top manager 2 – Stage IV.3] 
The firm’s approach to writing the contract changed as managers learned more about the contract’s 
importance. Beyond their general understanding of the contract’s legal and protective functions, 
they became much more aware of the definitional value of the contracting process to align 
expectations with their partner. Rosacom thus changed the way of allocating resources between 
contract drafting and operational tasks, in particular by devoting more financial resources to 
contract making. It also spent more time, accepting that the process was taking longer than 
expected and was not completed in its early stages. 
Similarly, Rosacom managers initially had little idea of how a contract should be structured. 
During the contracting process, they were given access to templates of intellectual property 
contracts, which provided them a view of general contract structure and writing in their new 
industry. For instance, they discovered that a common contracting practice was to set the level of 
royalties at 30% and not 35%, as was proposed by the partner (Figure 1, IIa and IIIa). Thus 
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Rosacom managers acquired a general knowledge of contract content and organization, and the 
case analysis provides evidence that the contracting process served as a guide in this way. 
However, interviews performed at the end of the process suggest that this learning was rather 
limited. Because they delegated most writing tasks to the lawyers, Rosacom managers are still 
unable to write a contract themselves, even after the 17-month negotiation period. 
 
About the parties 
It also appears that through the successive analyses of contractual documents, Rosacom learned 
much about its partner. Although such a finding confirms what was already shown by Mayer and 
Argyres (2004) in relation to Softstar and its trading partner HW Inc, the analysis of the case 
suggests a finer distinction between learning about the other party’s ability on the one hand and its 
intentions and expectations on the other hand. Such a distinction is important as it strongly 
supports different trust mechanisms (Malhotra and Lumineau, 2011). 
First, reading and talking about the proposed contractual versions helped Rosacom to get a better 
idea of Mediacorp’s relative strengths and weaknesses in terms of ability and skills. For instance, 
when Rosacom managers discussed the clause about the artistic stage, they discovered how 
Mediacorp’s corporate group was organized and how the preproduction stage of the series would 
be performed by one of its subsidiaries. 
“In this clause, it is stated that Mediacorp will not perform the artistic stage itself. Rather, it 
will be done by one its subsidiaries” [The legal consultant – Stage II.2] 
Thus a close reading of the clauses helped Rosacom learn about its partner’s real level of expertise 
and its reliance on a subsidiary to execute a complex part of the project. 
Second, Rosacom learned more and more about Mediacorp’s real intentions with each draft of the 
contract. For instance, the analysis of the contractual documents submitted by Mediacorp at stages 
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II and III provided information about its real intentions and strategy. Mediacorp provided 
documents in which the allocation of rights and responsibilities appeared clearly unbalanced and 
in Mediacorp’s favor, with royalties higher than industry standards (Stage II.3). Since Mediacorp 
said nothing about such changes when they sent the new contract version, Rosacom managers 
discovered them by chance when reading the contract. The fact that such changes were not 
negotiated but were surreptitiously put in the contract was perceived by Rosacom as an 
opportunistic move by Mediacorp. Careful reading of the clause therefore showed Rosacom its 
partner’s potential opportunism and hidden agenda (Stage II.4). The same phenomenon is seen in 
version IV, in which Mediacorp introduced modifications differing from version III. 
“Mediacorp’s commission has just jumped back up to 35%... The part indicating that the 
preproduction stage would be located in [our area] has also disappeared.” [The legal 
consultant, in a sarcastic tone – Stage IV.1] 
Such learning through the contracting process about Mediacorp’s opportunistic behavior directly 
triggered new negotiations between the partners. As Rosacom felt it had successfully thwarted 
Mediacorp’s opportunistic attempts, it nevertheless decided not to break the alliance. 
Furthermore, during the negotiation process, issues raised by those in charge of contract crafting 
led Rosacom to reconsider some of its needs and requirements in the alliance. This is particularly 
striking for the definition of preproduction arrangements (Stages II.2 and III.3, Table 1, b). From 
the exchanges with Mediacorp, it emerged that Mediacorp considered this point to be very 
important. As a consequence, Rosacom managers began to suspect that geographic location was a 
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major issue in the contract. Rosacom thus progressively viewed this clause as central, indicating 
that associated property rights granted by the clause were of utmost importance.1 
“Now we know on which points we will not budge: we will not give in regarding the 
preproduction stage, which is crucial to us.” [Rosacom top manager 2 – Stage II.2]. 
 
About the transaction features 
The contract drafts and templates also clarified the transaction features, that is, the specifics of this 
deal. At the beginning of the negotiations, Rosacom had only a broad and rather hazy idea of the 
scope of the alliance. Although the general objective was to use its exclusive rights over a toy to 
develop cartoon episodes, at this stage Rosacom did not know precisely what they wanted to do 
and what could be accomplished in partnership with Mediacorp. Thus, for this complex and 
innovative project of animation movie development, an important object of learning was related to 
the features of the transaction in regard both to its nature and its scope. 
The discussion of the successive contractual documents was central for learning about the precise 
nature of the activities to be implemented. In particular, the parties had to explicitly discuss what 
was included in and what was excluded from their joint project. For instance, the lawyer noted that 
some aspects of the project had to be further negotiated because there were some missing clauses 
from early versions of the contract (Stage I.2). 
“From the analysis of the agreement it appears that a certain amount of contractual 
arrangements have not been considered by the parties and should be discussed in the course 
of current negotiations.” [The lawyer – Stage III.1] 
                                                            
1  We specifically refer to the recent paper by Kim and Mahoney (2010) for a discussion on Coase’s (1960) 
and Alchian’s (1977) property rights insights regarding the contractual process as a way to discover key information 
and new opportunities. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us in this direction. 
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The lawyer then developed the description of agreement duration, confidentiality, sanctions, and 
conflict resolution techniques, referring to standard alliance contract structure and industry 
templates. Without suggesting any content, he urged the parties to discuss these elements before 
moving ahead with the alliance contract. Later in the process, the parties used the contract during 
joint work meetings in order to discuss what they wanted to do together in the alliance (Stage 
IV.2). 
“During the meeting, [Top manager 1] then declared that we would reconsider all the 
contractual arrangements. We negotiated the wording of the last contract version, 
paragraph by paragraph. I had with me notes from the lawyer and the legal consultant, 
which helped me a lot.” [Rosacom top manager 2 – Stage IV.2] 
Following the trail of drafts allowed new issues to emerge and determined which points of the 
project had to be refined. In that sense, it guided the parties to determine which points had to be 
further elaborated. Therefore, learning about the objectives and the general shape and scope of the 
alliance were clearly driven by the use of contractual documents. 
 
Thus the case study shows that the 17-month contracting process led our focal firm to gain a more 
accurate appreciation of both what it wanted to do and what it could really do. More precisely, as 
summarized in Figure 3, learning concerned three related areas: learning about the contracting 
process, about the parties, and about the transaction features. We now turn to how this learning 
took place. 
––– Insert Figure 3 about here ––– 
 
Learning mechanisms 
Experiential learning 
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As is apparent from the case study, experience was a key driver of learning for Rosacom. As 
managers gained experience with this specific partner and about this particular project, they 
progressively developed their knowledge in the three fields mentioned above. Our focal firm 
typically learned through trial-and-error: managers assessed the outcomes of their decisions based 
on both their partner’s and their experts’ reactions. Whenever they were dissatisfied with an 
existing choice, they undertook corrective actions. One piece of evidence for this learning-by-
doing is when they discovered the limitations of their usual lawyer; Rosacom managers finally 
sought the services of a specialized lawyer (Stage I.1). 
This finding about an incremental updating based on the interpretation of experience confirms 
prior research. However, contrary to recent studies that often assume a traditional learning-curve 
perspective (Vanneste and Puranam, 2010), we did not observe a linear relationship between 
contractual details and experience (see Figure 2). We further discuss this finding below. 
 
Vicarious learning 
In addition to the learning process based on experience, the analysis of the Rosacom-Mediacorp 
case indicates that interventions by external parties strongly influenced learning in contracting. 
This reliance on other parties’ knowledge is indicative of vicarious learning (Baum, Li, and Usher, 
2000; Kim and Miner, 2007; Terlaak and Gong, 2008). 
The interview data indicate that the recourse to experienced acquaintances played a key role in 
supporting learning during the contracting process. For instance, one manager asked an 
acquaintance to provide him an example of a contract so that he could use it as a guideline for his 
own contract. Each of the two experts helping Rosacom—the lawyer specialized in intellectual 
property and the legal consultant—also supported the acquisition of new knowledge, but they 
provided access to a wider knowledge base than the acquaintances by insisting both on contract 
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content and on contract process. The experts were sometimes crucial in the analysis and 
interpretation of the contract. They encouraged Rosacom to both codify their intentions for the 
alliance project in formal terms and to decode the various contractual versions. Not only did they 
directly teach Rosacom managers certain aspects of contract management, but they also insisted on 
the fact that they had to be more rigorous when drafting and interpreting contracts. Experts played 
an important role in helping managers change their perceptions and preconceived ideas about 
contracts and, on some occasions, needed to insist forcefully to make the managers aware of what 
was at stake in contract negotiation. 
“I have just seen [Top manager 1] and [Top manager 2], and I have shaken them up a bit, 
we had somewhat harsh words. I found them a rather too casual about contract drafting.” 
[The legal consultant – Stage II.3] 
As Rosacom was struggling with a lack of information from its own experience, it used this 
vicarious learning strategy to gain clues about how to interpret and react to uncertainty and 
ambiguity. 
Thus, interestingly, this finding on the role of experts in supporting learning in the contracting 
process differs from previous research, which has not pointed out such an influence. For instance, 
Mayer and Argyres (2004: 398) note that “[l]awyers played no direct role in the negotiation of the 
[statements of work].” We return to this finding in our discussion. 
 
Inferential learning 
Besides the role of experience and external parties, learning also relied on a process of inferences. 
Rosacom managers used the contract to form an opinion based on what they already knew and the 
contract was then used as a basis for reflection and to draw contextualized inferences. This work 
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of virtual implementation of the contract repeatedly served as a basis for projection of the future 
and helped Rosacom managers to assess the relevance of the contractual arrangements. 
The assessment of contract modifications not discussed between the partners provides an example 
of the way in which inferential learning was leveraged during the contracting process. Rosacom 
managers initially stated orally that the preproduction stage would be located in their geographic 
area. However, in the two first versions that Mediacorp transmitted to Rosacom, there was no 
mention of the location (see Table 1, Stages I.1 and II.2). The sources of this omission were 
ambiguous. The Mediacorp top manager had indeed warned Rosacom managers that he was 
extremely busy when he prepared the contract and was not sure that it was flawless. Omissions 
could therefore stem from a lack of attention. Rosacom managers themselves thus added this 
mention in the third version on which they worked and sent it to Mediacorp (Table 1, Stage III.2). 
However, in the fourth version that Mediacorp sent back, the mention of the area had again 
disappeared (Table 1, Stage IV.2). The systematic omission of the geographic area by Mediacorp, 
while this point was considered important by Rosacom and had been orally agreed upon, led 
Rosacom managers to develop several hypotheses about Mediacorp’s behavior and intentions. 
This way of analyzing and interpreting the contracting process then encouraged Rosacom to look 
for further information on this particular point. 
It suggests the presence of some inferential learning (Huber, 1991; March, Sproull, and Tamuz, 
1991; Miner and Mezias, 1996) during the contracting process. With their limited experience, 
Rosacom managers made deliberate efforts to enhance their understanding of the alliance project 
through a simulation of hypothetical future scenarios and a consideration of multiple 
interpretations of experience. At Rosacom, typical work on the contractual documents involved 
taking a critical clause and speculating about Mediacorp’s potential behavior (for instance, at 
Stages I.2, II.2, and IV.1). As a way of detecting and correcting loopholes, it enabled Rosacom to 
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refine its approach to the contractual process and to improve its ability to contract. This careful 
examination of different options was a way of organizing and improving their thinking about 
themselves, their partner, and the alliance project. The building of possible scenarios on the 
evolution of the alliance served as a guide for choosing among different options as well as for 
developing new ones. These “thought experiments” (Ricoeur, 1984) enabled Rosacom managers 
to generate new meanings and consider new actions (Garud, Dunbar, and Bartel, 2011) by leading 
them to ask how they would react and what would be the implications of a given scenario for a set 
of contractual choices. Such inferences relied, for instance, on generalization, abstraction, 
association, and characterization (Michalski, 1994). This type of inferential learning relied on two 
complementary steps. Rosacom managers interpreted information and tried to make sense of their 
partner’s behavior. They then made deductions to anticipate a causal connection between what 
they observed and potential reactions from Mediacorp. They therefore used the contracting process 
to develop heuristics to guide their behavior on the basis of both reliability—i.e. the generation of 
an understanding of phenomena—and anticipatory validity—i.e. the construction of causal 
belief—(March et al., 1991; Oldroyd and Gulati, 2010). 
 
Particular combinations of objects and mechanisms of learning 
The case findings suggest some particular combinations between objects and mechanisms of 
learning at the different stages of the alliance. As already discussed, learning about the other party 
was particularly well supported by inferential learning (in addition to experiential learning). In 
contrast, learning about the contracting process was particularly well supported by vicarious 
learning (in addition to experiential learning). 
In addition, we found evidence of different timing patterns for each type of learning mechanism. 
The findings indicate a difference in both their chronological order and their respective length. We 
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observed that experiential learning developed throughout the contracting process (Stages I to V) as 
Rosacom progressively accumulated experience. Vicarious learning occurred mostly in the 
beginning and the middle stages of the contracting process (mostly at Stages II and III). We 
specifically explained, in particular, how Rosacom relied on external experts to organize the 
contractual negotiations at the beginning of the process. In contrast, inferential learning 
mechanisms occurred mostly at the end of the process (mostly at Stage IV). As it took Rosacom 
time to gather clues, make inferences, and weigh up different options in relation to its partner and 
the transaction, inferential learning strategies were not used at the beginning of the contracting 
process. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The supporting role of contracting for learning 
The results reveal characteristics of the contracting process supporting the cognitive activities of 
organizational learning. 
On the one hand, the analysis of the Rosacom-Mediacorp case suggests that the contracting 
process has properties that helped the parties to separate the complexity of the alliance project into 
a number of constituent elements for interpretation. The importance of simplification has been 
pointed out by research in cognitive science, that links simplicity with effective encoding of 
learning (Broadbent, 1958; Miller, 1956). The detailed drafting of each clause led the firms to 
codify their respective goals and expectations by breaking down issues. This detailed 
interpretation and drafting of each aspect of the alliance allowed them to acquire a better grasp of 
the alliance project. It then reduced the necessary cognitive efforts of protagonists to progressively 
deal with more complex issues (Bingham, Eisenhardt, and Davis, 2007). The rigorous analysis of 
each clause and its implications forced the parties to think deeply about each dimension of their 
  25 
collaboration. It led the parties to think about their intentions and their views on the alliance and 
thereby helped them to verbalize their expectations. 
On the other hand, the contractual interface forced the articulation of ideas and beliefs around a 
common reference point. It helped the different parties to focus their attention on a set of common 
issues and to discuss their choices. The contractual document pushed the parties to reflect and 
think inside its coherent frame. Thus, beyond the diversity of actors involved in the alliance 
project, the contract provided a shared format across the two firms. Communication around a 
standard juridical language in the contract made the convergence between Rosacom’s and 
Mediacorp’s corporate cultures and languages easier. For example, the contractual document 
forced the parties to define key terms and thereby helped them to overcome any misunderstanding 
linked with their respective corporate jargon. Organizational learning was here supported by the 
use of this common lexicon that prescribes a means for sharing information (Carlile, 2004; 
Kellogg, Orlikowski, and Yates, 2006). 
 
We specifically explain below how the contracting process supported experiential, vicarious, and 
inferential learning processes. 
First, the Rosacom-Mediacorp case provides evidence that the contract supported access to 
information and resources. While it supported the transfer of information across space and 
organizations, it also supported interaction between the different parties through the successive 
stages of negotiations. By storing and retrieving information over 17 months, it assisted 
interorganizational memory around the alliance project. As the acquisition of new knowledge 
depends critically on a sufficient basis of prior related knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
Grant, 1996), this function of organizational memory (Huber, 1991) to store, accumulate, and 
retrieve information greatly facilitated experiential learning. Not only did the contract serve as a 
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storehouse for knowledge and shared memory but this base of common knowledge was also 
helpful in new knowledge assimilation and absorption. 
Second, as we observed from the beginning of the Rosacom-Mediacorp alliance formation, the 
contracting process constitutes a forum that brings together the protagonists. The contract was 
used as a virtual meeting place where geographically scattered actors could converge and 
exchange opinions and ideas. It was a privileged means of initiating communication at different 
levels: within Rosacom, between Rosacom and its external experts, and between Rosacom and 
Mediacorp. By supporting the acquisition of Mediacorp and the external experts’ information 
through observation and imitation, this contractual feature facilitated vicarious learning in 
particular (Levitt and March, 1988). 
Third, the case study shows that the contractual process supports the development of inferences. 
Rosacom had no previous experience in the animation movie industry and it was difficult to know 
how to organize the alliance launch from scratch. The initial contractual template used by 
Rosacom managers served as a guide and allowed them to deal with the complexity of the 
alliance’s negotiations. Both for internal discussions and for negotiations with Mediacorp, the 
contract was used as a management tool to organize the order and the way in which to analyze 
issues point by point and develop inferences. The contracting process also supported learning 
through the analysis of scenarios for the alliance. 
 
The dynamics of contracting and learning 
As the findings of the case study suggest, contract and organizational learning are involved in a 
process that is applied recursively. While previous research has largely focused on the impact of 
the contract on learning effects (see Mayer and Argyres, 2004: 405-406, for an exception to this), 
we reveal a mutual relationship between learning and contracting. Our findings suggest that 
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drafting contractual clauses fosters learning and, in turn, this learning triggers new cycles of 
contractual negotiations. We observed numerous feedback loops between the different objects of 
learning: for example, when the acquisition of knowledge or insights about the partner’s real 
ability led Rosacom to modify the clause about the artistic aspect of the alliance (Stage II.2). In 
turn, this change fostered new discussions about the exact scope of the project. We have 
highlighted the progressive development of an interactional framework (Sawyer, 1999; Tsoukas, 
2009) which emerges from joint action between the partners through the process of contract 
making. It appears that the contracting process helped to combine acquisition and integration of 
knowledge with its transformation and re-arrangement for the alliance project. At the same time, 
the contract gave an orientation and coherence to the negotiations (Li, Poppo, and Zhou, 2010). 
The process we observed was not simply a linear succession of stages. The partners repeatedly 
acquired information, which led them to reconsider their initial contractual choices. What was 
learned during the contracting process directly affected the contractual governance choice, which, 
in turn, supported new learning. In this regard, the contract may be more than a flexible and 
adjustable framework (Llewellyn, 1931: 737; Mayer and Argyres, 2004: 406), as it may also 
support the cognitive activities of organizational learning during the specific stage of contract 
making. As well as giving coherence to the negotiations—as a framework—the contract also helps 
the parties to gather and process information useful for developing an alliance project. 
Furthermore, in regard to the types of learning that take place in the contracting process, our study 
also generates additional insights into how different forces come into play at the same time. Prior 
studies are divided about the effects of partnering experience on governance structure. Some 
scholars argue that increased familiarity with the partner enhances the ability to design contractual 
structures (Dekker, 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002), while others argue that partner experience 
reduces the need for extensive governance structures (Gulati and Nickerson, 2008; Zollo, Reuer, 
  28 
and Singh, 2002). Our findings contribute to clarifying the tensions between needs and ability in 
contracting (Dekker and Van den Abbeele, 2010). Our recursive view suggests that firms learn to 
make relevant choices and adjust the level of contractual detail based on perceived needs. What is 
learned from the contracting process about the partner and the transaction helps the parties to 
adjust their governance choices. At the same time, learning how to make contracts enables them to 
improve their ability to develop a contract more suited to their needs. 
 
The timing of learning strategies 
The findings reveal specific combinations between objects and mechanisms of learning at the 
different stages of the alliance, something that has not been explored in previous research on 
interfirm contracts. It may be that at the initial stage of the contracting process, learning is mostly 
vicarious and relies on external parties to compensate for the lack of experience with the partner 
and the transaction features. Learning through other parties may be the quickest way to learn about 
simple aspects that are easily transferred. Later, it may be that when firms have gained some 
knowledge about how to organize the contracting process, they will become more aware of the 
opportunities to develop inferences from the contract. As such a learning mechanism requires 
much time and attention to be really effective, it might explain why we observed inferential 
learning mostly at the end of the process. Another potential explanation is that because individuals 
tend to value learning through their own experience more than the experience of others (March, 
2009), when they have the choice between different learning mechanisms, they prefer to rely less 
on vicarious learning and to emphasize other learning mechanisms. In fact, an impediment to 
vicarious learning we observed in the case analysis was the skepticism of managers regarding the 
value of experts’ knowledge. In particular, managers perceived the lawyers’ emphasis on the 
importance of the contract structure as a professional bias. Our findings also suggest that at each 
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stage of the contracting process, Rosacom combined several learning mechanisms and found 
alternative mechanisms to complement its experiential learning. It might be that firms may want to 
“triangulate” the outcomes of different learning mechanisms to cross-examine and validate their 
findings during the contracting process by leveraging complementarities between different 
learning mechanisms. While the literature suggests that learning from limited experience presents 
significant learning challenges (e.g. Baum and Dahlin, 2007; Greve, 2003; Kim, Kim, and Miner, 
2009), our case analysis suggests that the contracting process may help firms to reduce this 
challenge by supporting a combination of multiple learning strategies. 
 
Toward an emerging approach to alignment 
A related implication of our study is that while research has mostly focused on the ex post 
functions of interfirm contracts to govern the transaction (e.g. Lumineau and Malhotra, 2011; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002), we suggest that the contract is also useful ex ante the alliance execution. 
TCE dictates that “credible contracting is very much an exercise in farsighted contracting, 
whereby the parties look ahead, recognize hazards, and devise hazard mitigating responses” 
(Williamson, 1999: 1090) and assumes an alignment of governance mechanisms with given 
transaction attributes (Williamson, 1985). In addition, our recursive view helps to explain why 
transaction attributes may not be entirely exogenous for complex projects. As the findings suggest, 
the transaction characteristics are not necessarily predetermined, since they may be part of the 
negotiations between the partners during the contracting process. In the same way, the level of 
uncertainty and the likelihood of partner’s opportunism may be progressively evaluated through 
the contracting process. Some of the transaction attributes may be the result of a socially 
embedded process of learning between the trading parties. As we have seen with the changing 
perception of Rosacom toward Mediacorp, formal and informal aspects of the alliance agreement 
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were built at the same time. An important part of learning in the contracting process seems to deal 
with an understanding of the “rules of the game”―that is, how the underlying normative 
conventions come to complement the formal contract. In our case, as Rosacom progressively 
understood that Mediacorp would have a pretty rigid approach to enforcing the clauses, it 
consequently revised its approach to the formal contract. Our analysis therefore suggests an 
emerging approach of the alignment between transaction attributes and contractual governance 
that is progressive and results from learning during the contracting process. The different objects 
of learning—about the parties, the contracting process, and the transaction features—have to be 
jointly considered, since they directly influence each other. The nature of the relationship with the 
trading partner during the contracting process influences the contractual choice and the scope of 
the transaction. The answers to the questions “What is doable in our collaboration?” and “What are 
we ready to make with this partner?” are not necessarily known at the beginning of the contracting 
process. Our findings actually indicate that the contracting process is a way of progressively 
dealing with risks and uncertainty in complex transactions. We thus call for further research 
looking at the ex ante stages of alliances and developing a processual view of alignment. 
 
Managerial implications 
Contracting is a key challenge that firms face when engaging in alliances (Contractor and Ra, 
2000; Faems et al., 2008). We argue that one aspect of alliance management relies on the proper 
management of the contracting process to enhance the different learning potentialities of contracts. 
Moreover, alliance managers should address both contractual structure and process. The different 
parties engaged in the contracting process should be more than “transaction cost engineers” 
(Gilson, 1984). They should not only focus on the technical ability of the contractual governance 
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structure to govern a transaction. As a social activity between trading partners, parties should pay 
attention to the contracting process. 
It is also important for managers to be aware of the limitations of contracts. As the findings 
suggested, they should keep in mind that too much formalization of the alliance agreement can be 
harmful, causing rigidity and diminishing trust between the partners (Vlaar, Van Den Bosch, and 
Volberda, 2007). In addition, the “race to learn” in which partners seek to steal their partner’s 
knowledge as soon as they possibly can—often depicted in the strategic alliance literature (Hamel, 
1991; Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998; Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter, 2000)—is already at work 
at the stage of contract making even before the beginning of the alliance execution. As the 
contracting process represents some sunk costs and a partner-specific investment, a hold-up may 
occur before the signing of the contract and the actual start of the alliance. Managers should be 
aware that contracting is a risky process with potential opportunism from the trading partner. That 
is why managers should also take care to select their partner with a view to developing a fruitful 
contracting process. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our single case study—although consistent with our revelatory approach—requires caution when 
generalizing our findings. Since our insights are contextualized in the study of the Rosacom-
Mediacorp contracting process, we discuss below the likely influence of three types of factors. 
First, our analysis is temporally focused on the stage of contract making. The combination of 
learning mechanisms we observed is likely to be specific to this stage of alliance formation. It may 
be that at the initial stage of contracting, the lack of experience with the partner and the transaction 
features constrain the use of experiential learning strategies; whereas once the project is launched, 
firms tend to focus on experiential learning. It would then explain why previous research on 
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learning to contract—having focused on the post-agreement stage and contract execution (e.g. 
Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Dekker and Van den Abbeele, 2010)—only discusses experiential 
learning. Thus we identify a complementary line of inquiry to explore (1) the connections between 
learning in the stage of contract making with learning in contract execution, (2) the relationship 
(e.g. substitution or complementary effects) between the different types of learning at each stage of 
the alliance, (3) learning between transactions (same type or different types), and (4) learning with 
the same partner vs. with different partners. 
Second, we studied an alliance around a complex and innovative project―developing a cartoon. 
For such a creative artistic development, there was no specific predetermined contractual template, 
leaving much room for negotiations between the parties. Our empirical context was characterized 
by a high level of uncertainty and ambiguity about the nature of the project, the final product, and 
the partner. The contract thus had a key role in organizing the exchange. It is likely that the 
contracting process plays a less important role in simpler or highly routine transactions (Argyres 
and Mayer, 2007). The different aspects of learning we pointed out are less likely to develop in 
shorter or less strategically important alliances where the parties devote fewer human and financial 
resources (e.g. the involvement of external experts such as lawyers) to the contracting process. It 
would be interesting to look more closely at the type of resources needed to support each type of 
learning in the contracting process. 
Third, the Rosacom-Mediacorp dyad involved considerable asymmetry in terms of size between 
the parties. The geographical distance between the partners and the absence of a prior relationship 
may also help explain the role of the contract in supporting learning. It may be, for instance, that 
firms less distant—in terms of power, location, familiarity, etc.—do not rely so much on the 
contract to learn about their partner and/or about the transaction features. 
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In the same way, our focal firm was a small organization in the animated film industry, with the 
two top managers in charge of most strategic and operational concerns. Studies analyzing the role 
of dedicated functions in knowledge accumulation suggest that a firm with a legal department 
might have learned differently (Argyres and Mayer, 2007). We thus call for further research on the 
influence of a dedicated alliance function (Kale et al., 2002), organizational routines (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982), or systematic procedural learning processes (Sarkar, Aulakh, and Madhok, 2009) to 
capture, leverage, and share both explicit and tacit lessons from the contracting process. 
Beyond the limitations directly related to the specificities of our empirical context, our view of the 
contracting process opens up a number of avenues for future research. We suggest that research on 
alliance contracts would benefit by going beyond the traditional economic framework, and we 
invite scholars to pursue our study of the microdynamics of contracting with analysis rooted in 
other social sciences. We specifically advance some ideas to further our understanding of interfirm 
contracting and “unpack” contracting and learning dynamics with insights from sociological and 
psychocognitive approaches. 
––– Insert Table 2 about here ––– 
All in all, our research sheds significant light on the theory and practice of the alliance contracting 
process related to organizational learning and highlights promising pathways for future research. 
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TABLE 1 
Evolution of main contract clauses 
 
  
Contract - version I 
 
Contract - version II 
 
 
Contract - version III 
 
Contract - version IV 
 
Contract - version V (final) 
 
 
Marketing and 
merchandising 
of the series 
 
a. The marketing of TV and 
videographic rights will be 
done worldwide exclusively 
by Mediacorp, which will 
receive a commission of 
35% + marketing expenses. 
 
a. The marketing of TV and 
videographic rights will be 
done worldwide exclusively 
by Mediacorp, except for 
territories and other 
potential coproducers. 
 
The merchandising will be 
handled worldwide by 
Mediacorp, which will 
receive a commission of 
35% on gross revenue + 
marketing expenses. 
 
a. Mediacorp shall be in 
charge of the marketing of 
the series worldwide, except 
for territories which are 
reserved to other potential 
producers. The parties agree 
to establish a distribution 
contract after this 
Agreement and before any 
marketing implementation. 
(…) 
The merchandising will be 
handled worldwide by 
Mediacorp, which will 
thereby receive a 
commission of 30% on 
gross revenue and will add 
marketing expenses up to 
the limit of 10% of gross 
receipt collected. 
 
 
a. Mediacorp will be in 
charge of merchandising 
worldwide and will receive 
a commission of 35% on 
gross receipt collected + 
marketing expenses. 
 
a. Mediacorp shall handle the 
marketing of the series 
worldwide, except for 
territories which are reserved 
to other potential producers. 
(…) 
The merchandising will be 
done worldwide by 
Mediacorp or any of its 
subsidiary, which will 
receive a commission of 30% 
for [Country] and 35% for 
other countries on gross 
receipt collected and will add 
the marketing expenses up to 
the limit of 10% of gross 
receipts collected. 
      
Location of art 
management 
b. (none) b. The art management and 
the preproduction of the 
series will be done by 
Rosacom (management, 
storyboard, executive 
production). The right to the 
final cut is reserved to the 
broadcaster. 
b. The preproduction stage 
will be located in [territory] 
under Rosacom’s 
responsibility which will be 
the executive producer. Any 
other choice of 
preproduction location or 
executive producer 
designation is to be 
submitted in written form 
from Rosacom. 
 
b. The preproduction will be 
done by Rosacom 
(management, storyboard, 
executive production). The 
right to final cut is granted 
to Mediacorp. 
b. The art management and 
the preproduction stage are 
located in [territory] under 
Rosacom’s responsibility 
(management, storyboard, 
executive production). The 
right to final cut is reserved 
to the broadcaster. 
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TABLE 2 
Suggestions for future research on contracting and learning processes 
 
 
 Analysis of the microdynamics of learning in contracting 
 
 Sociological perspective Psychocognitive perspective 
 
   
From the 
actors 
- Who are the actors? 
- What is the relationship between these actors? 
- What are their respective interests and agenda? 
- What is important for the decision makers? 
- What is their formal and informal bargaining 
power? 
- What are their roles, responsibilities, 
incentives, and time frames? 
- What is the influence of the cultural, 
organizational, and institutional contexts? (role 
of the system of beliefs, values, ideologies, 
structures, or norms) 
 
 Ariño and Ring, 2010; Bidwell, 2010; 
Husted and Folger, 2004 
 
- What are the different facets of bounded 
rationality? 
- How do individuals and groups cope with 
the cognitive challenges of contracting? 
- What is the role of psychocognitive 
influences? (e.g. reference level bias, initial 
representations, perceptual effect, heuristics, 
attribution error, anchoring, role of the affect 
and emotions, adaptive preference, or 
preference reversal) 
- What is the influence of the parties’ 
psychocognitive background? (i.e. their 
experience, age, gender, training, risk profile, 
etc.) 
 
 Foss, 2003; Weber, Mayer, and 
Macher, 2011 
 
   
From the 
contract 
- How is the contract used in practice? 
- What is the role devoted to the contract? 
- What are the non legal properties of the 
contract? 
 
 Suchman, 2003 
- How does the contracting process influence 
sense making? 
- What are the framing effects of contractual 
structures? 
- How and why contracts may induce different 
behaviors and expectations? 
 
 Lumineau and Malhotra, 2011; Vlaar 
et al., 2007; Weber and Mayer, 2011 
 
  
 FIGURE 1 
Main stages of the Rosacom-Mediacorp contracting process 
Contract version I 
The first contract version is drafted by Mediacorp, following 
Rosacom’s request. 
Contract version II 
Mediacorp also drafted the second version of the contract. 
Although quite similar to the first version, this draft had a higher 
level of detail (see the addition of the clause on the location of 
art management in Table 2). With the help of two external 
professionals, Rosacom was now able to conduct a finer-grained 
analysis of the proposed contract. 
Contract version III 
The third contract version, proposed to Mediacorp, was the 
longest of all contract versions with an increase of more than 
1450 words from the second version (+30.7%; see Figure 2). 
This complexity is particularly well represented through the 
drafting of the clause pertaining to commercialization (see Table 
2, IIIa.). 
Contract version IV 
Rosacom managers came back from the meeting and 
waited for their consultant’s advice on the fourth version 
before signing it. 
Contract 
version V 
This fifth contract 
version was signed by 
both Rosacom and 
Mediacorp and served as 
the official agreement for 
the alliance. 
I.2 –The specialized lawyer observed that the contract 
was not detailed enough and some clauses usually 
present in some long-term contracts were absent. There 
was no mention of the location of art management (see 
Table 2); which is nevertheless a crucial aspect of such 
deal. The specialized lawyer therefore discouraged 
Rosacom from signing the contract in its current state 
and advised them to renegotiate so that Rosacom 
managers could refine the agreement. 
I.3 – In reaction to their legal 
counsel’s advice, Rosacom 
managers concluded that the 
contract version was not 
sufficiently precise. Through 
several e-mail exchanges, 
they tried to obtain more 
precise details from 
Mediacorp representatives. 
While Rosacom top managers 
appreciated those exchanges, 
they highlighted the loopholes 
of the current written 
contract. They finally 
requested that their partner 
present a second draft with 
greater precision. 
I.1 – At first, Rosacom 
managers considered that 
their usual lawyer was 
capable enough to handle the 
legal dimension of the 
negotiation. As they 
encountered growing 
difficulties with their usual 
lawyer, Rosacom managers 
decided to hire a lawyer 
specialized in intellectual 
property, in spite of the 
higher fees involved. 
II.2 – While Rosacom 
managers did not pay much 
attention to the clause relating 
to the exploitation of the 
series, both the consultant and 
the lawyer considered that it 
did not match the industry 
standard of royalty amounts. 
Moreover, the experts noticed 
that a provision regarding the 
location of preproduction 
stage which had been 
supposedly negotiated was 
missing from the contract. 
Thus, they brought to the 
attention of Rosacom 
managers that the contractual 
document poorly reflected 
some dimensions of the 
negotiation. 
II.1 – Rosacom managers 
contacted a consultant. While 
the relationship with this 
professional was originally 
dedicated to the preparation 
of business scenarios, 
Rosacom managers gradually 
learnt that this consultant had 
considerable experience in 
contract negotiation. They 
thus rapidly shifted the 
consultant’s field of 
intervention from counsel to 
contract analysis and drafting. 
They then decided to show 
him systematically the 
contractual documents. 
II.3 – Counsel took charge of 
most of the drafting of the new 
version of the contract. The 
consultant and the lawyer 
proposed a precise definition 
of expenditure and added 
some elements which made 
the contract, in their eyes, 
more convergent with the state 
of negotiations (see Table 2, 
clauses IIIa vs. IIa and clauses 
IIIb vs. IIb). The work done 
led to a third version of the 
contract that was then sent to 
Mediacorp. 
II.4 – Rosacom managers 
started to suspect that 
imprecision had been 
willingly left in the contract, 
so that it would be easier for 
Mediacorp to behave 
opportunistically in the 
future. Mediacorp was still 
seen as unavoidable in the 
field but was no longer 
considered as reliable as it 
initially seemed to be. 
III.1 – When Mediacorp 
received the third contract 
version, its chief negotiator 
observed that the version 
contained substantial 
differences from the second 
one. He then asked for a 
meeting to negotiate the 
details of certain points. 
Rosacom managers however 
generally felt that they agreed 
with their partner. 
III.3 – During the initial 
negotiation, Rosacom 
managers clearly perceived 
they were in a subordinate 
position vis-à-vis Mediacorp. 
However Rosacom realized 
that it brought the most 
valuable resources to the 
alliance. This induced a shift 
in their power asymmetry’s 
representation. Rosacom 
managers therefore decided to 
adopt a more aggressive 
stance in negotiations. 
Rosacom managers became 
convinced that the negotiation 
of the preproduction clause 
was a strategic stake for their 
company. 
III.2 – Rosacom and Mediacorp 
representatives took part in the meeting 
without their advisors. During the 
meeting, a new document was drafted. 
They discussed each clause by using the 
contract as a guide, deciding what had to 
be changed or kept. 
IV.1 – Although Rosacom 
managers seemed fairly 
satisfied by the outcome of 
the negotiation, the consultant 
pointed out again some 
imprecision in the contract. 
By comparing the clauses 
from the third and fourth 
contract versions (see Table 
2, clauses IVa vs. IIIa and 
clauses IVb vs. IIIb), the 
reaction of the legal 
consultant contrasted with the 
managers’. He then firmly 
concluded that the fourth 
version could not be accepted 
as a final version. 
IV.2 – Although they were starting to 
grow tired of the negotiating process, 
following the legal consultant’s 
recommendations, the two Rosacom 
managers asked for another meeting. After 
a three-hour negotiation, the parties finally 
reached a mutually satisfactory contract 
which was then signed (fifth version). 
IV.3 – In retrospect, 
Rosacom recognized the 
importance of the 
contract. 
April 2005 – September 2005 December 2006 October 2005 – March 2006 April 2006 – June 2006 July 2006 – November 2006 
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FIGURE 2 
General evolution of the alliance contract 
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FIGURE 3 
Objects of learning in the contracting process 
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